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The Safety Valve and Climate Policy
Henry D. Jacoby† and A. Denny Ellerman
Abstract
The “safety valve” is a possible addition to a cap-and-trade system of emissions regulation whereby
the authority offers to sell permits in unlimited amount at a pre-set price. In this way the cost of
meeting the cap can be limited. It was proposed in the U.S. as a way to control perceived high costs of
the Kyoto Protocol, and possibly as a way to shift the focus of policy from the quantity targets of the
Protocol to emissions price. In international discussions, the idea emerged as a proposal for a
compliance penalty. The usefulness of the safety valve depends on the conditions under which it
might be introduced. For a time it might tame an overly stringent emissions target. It also can help
control the price volatility during the introduction of gradually tightening one, although permit
banking can ultimately serve the same function. It is unlikely to serve as a long-term feature of a cap-
and-trade system, however, because of the complexity of coordinating price and quantity instruments
and because it will interfere with the development of systems of international emissions trade.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The safety valve emerged out of discussions in the United States that presumed that the Kyoto
Protocol might be implemented by a system of marketable permits or cap and trade, similar to
that implemented in the U.S. Acid Rain Program. Under a marketable permit system an
emissions constraint or “cap” is applied to a set of emitters, permits are distributed in this
amount, and trade is allowed in these emissions rights. The central idea of the safety valve is that
the cost of capping emissions at some target level can be limited by an offer from the regulatory
authority to sell permits in whatever quantity is demanded at a predetermined price. Thus, if
economic growth or other factors were to cause permit prices to be greater than expected, the
marginal cost of abatement would be limited to the safety valve price. In the US, the
establishment of a safety valve was also seen as a way of raising the likelihood of Protocol’s
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2ratification by blunting criticism that the cost of meeting the Kyoto targets would be too high.
Although interest in the safety valve has subsided as a result of the Bush Administration’s
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, it is likely to resurface in other proposals to place quantitative
limits on greenhouse gas emissions.
The safety valve is sometimes introduced as a policy innovation, but in fact it has close and
well-established relatives. It is similar to a per-unit penalty found in cap-and-trade systems where
the price is set at a high enough level that it is unlikely to be triggered. And, if the price is set
sufficiently low that emissions commonly exceed the quantity limit, it resembles an emissions
tax. Finally, it is akin to a proposal made by Roberts and Spence (1976) in a similar context that
emitters be given the choice of buying permits from the market or from the government at a
specified price.
In this note we explain the origins of the safety valve concept in considerations governing the
choice of policy instruments for pollution control in general, discuss closely related applications,
and trace the evolution of the concept in the climate context. We then consider the role this type
of hybrid instrument might play in future domestic policy of the U.S. or other countries, and
consider problems it would present within a system of international trade in emissions rights.
There are a number of issues of cap-and-trade system design that we do not address, such as
whether the cap should be sectoral or economy-wide, whether permits should be grandfathered
or auctioned (and in the latter case what should be done with revenues from permit sales), and
whether the system should be applied upstream or downstream. Also, although the Kyoto
Protocol and other proposals to mitigate climate change anticipate the inclusion of a number of
greenhouse gases, we will talk mainly in terms of CO2 denoted in tons of carbon, C. All the
points made here can be extended to analysis of carbon-equivalent emissions of multiple gases.
2. FACTORS IN POLICY DESIGN
2.1 The efficiency of price vs. quantity instruments
Much of the support for the safety valve as a component of a cap-and-trade system originates
in concern for the economic efficiency of emissions controls, and in particular for the choice
between quantity constraints and price penalties when the costs and benefits of emission controls
are uncertain. Which instrument is better depends on the relative sensitivity of the costs of
emissions reduction, and of the benefits (i.e., climate damage avoided by that reduction) as the
level of emission control is varied (Weitzman, 1974). Under uncertainty, the better instrument is
the one that is more likely to avoid a big mistake in the stringency of control imposed. For
greenhouse gases, it is clear that this is the price mechanism. The argument leading to this
conclusion is laid out in graphical form in the appendix, but it is sufficiently important to the
safety valve discussion to justify a brief summary here.
If the relationships of costs and benefits to the level of emission control are known with
certainty, the difference on efficiency grounds disappears. Either leads to the same control level
and the possibility of a large error is thus assumed away. But when these relationships are known
only approximately, the key to the choice is whether cost or benefit changes more rapidly as the
level of emission control is varied. In the jargon of economists, it depends on whether marginal
costs or marginal benefits change more with the level of emissions control. A quantity constraint
3is indicated if marginal benefits are more sensitive to the control level, but a tax is preferred if
marginal costs change more rapidly than marginal benefits.
To demonstrate, consider a case where the damages rise steeply as the level of control is
relaxed (perhaps because of some threshold effect) but the marginal control costs do not differ
greatly among levels of control. In this circumstance, it is more important to get the quantity
right and the price approach is more likely to lead to an inefficient outcome. Fixing the price
when costs are uncertain leaves the quantity undetermined, and the response of emitters to the
emissions price may turn out to produce emissions that exceed the threshold and trigger large
pollution damages.
In the opposite case, damages are not very sensitive to current emissions, but the costs are
very much more so. Here it is more important to get the price right and the choice of a quantity
constraint is more likely to go wrong. If a quantity target is chosen, the marginal costs of control
could be either much higher or much lower than would be optimal. Fixing the price in the range
of marginal damages will lead emitters to undertake controls only up to that level, reducing risk
of costs being way out of line from the benefits achieved.1
Carbon dioxide and most other anthropogenic GHGs have long residence times in the
atmosphere, so the climate issue falls into this latter category. Most studies expect climate
damage to rise with increasing atmospheric GHG concentrations (i.e., the stock of gases), but
emissions in any particular period make only a very small contribution to the existing stock.
Thus unless the additions to the stock in a particular period have the effect of pushing the system
over some threshold, as when the water level in a lake rises above the level of a dam, the
marginal damage of additional emissions in any single period is essentially constant.2 Such
thresholds are hypothesized for the climate system: for example, changes that would trigger a
drastic change in ocean circulations or the disintegration of Antarctic ice sheets. There is no
evidence, however, that the climate system is approaching any such threshold at the present time,
so the appropriate instrument for limiting GHG emissions is a price penalty on emissions.
This approach is not the one taken in the Kyoto Protocol, which imposes a quantitative
emissions constraint at the national level. The safety valve was born from the collision between
the desirability of using price instruments for these stock pollutants and the apparent political
attractiveness of the quantity approach. If the theoretically less-desirable quantity instrument is
to be chosen nonetheless, and the constraint is imposed by means of a cap-and-trade system,
policymakers can limit the prospects that the cap will impose costs that are far out of line with
benefits by setting a safety valve price at a level that approximates the marginal damage avoided.
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 This argument is frequently misunderstood. The point is not that the marginal benefit of emissions reduction is
zero. It is not. But it is not very sensitive to the changes in emissions in any particular period.
42.2 Close relatives of the safety valve
What we have described above can be considered the “pure” safety valve concept. It applies
where the regulators try to set the emissions cap at a level where the expected marginal cost of
meeting the constraint will turn out to be in line with their beliefs about marginal benefits. Then,
to avoid being too far wrong on the high-cost side they include a provision to sell emissions
permits at some price near or somewhat above that expected cost level.3 So, for example, if
expectations of cost outcomes were symmetrical about the expected level and the safety valve
price was set slightly above expected marginal cost, then the provision would have a slightly less
than 50% chance of being triggered. As such, it would be a hybrid price/quantity instrument. In
somewhat more than half the possible cost outcomes, marginal cost will be lower than the safety
valve price and emissions would be constrained to the quantity limit. In the remainder, the safety
valve price will determine marginal cost, emissions will exceed the quantity limit, and a payment
will be made for the excess emissions. This “pure” safety valve has two close relatives that differ
from it mainly in the probability that a payment will be required for exceeding the quantity limit.
• A financial penalty far above expected marginal cost. Cap-and-trade systems often
impose a penalty for uncovered emissions in the form of a per-unit fee set at a level far above
expected marginal cost.4 Although the motivation is different, this penalty is formally analogous
to the pure safety valve in that (1) the quantity limit can be exceeded upon payment of the
requisite fee, and (2) marginal costs and allowance prices will be no higher than the level set by
the “escape” mechanism.5 The main difference is that the penalty is set at a level that has a low
probability of being invoked: the quantity constraint is binding in nearly all instances.
For example, the U.S. Acid Rain Program initially imposed a penalty on SO2 emissions of
$2000 per short ton6: a level far above estimates of expected cost when the system was being
designed (Ellerman et al., 2000). Similarly, the proposed European Commission’s proposal for a
EU-wide emissions trading system would impose a penalty of the higher of (1) twice the average
market price in some predetermined period, or (2) 50 euros per metric ton of CO2 equivalent
during 2005-2007 or 100 euros during the First Commitment Period under the Kyoto Protocol
and beyond (CEC, 2001). These prices are roughly equivalent to $155 and $310 per ton of
carbon (tC). With the U.S. not participating in the Kyoto Protocol, the market price within the
Kyoto system as refined at Marrakech is expected to be far lower than these levels (Babiker et
al., 2002; den Elzen and de Moor, 2001). Refusal of international permit exchange and other
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5elements of flexibility would raise the cost, but even then the likelihood of this penalty being
triggered is slight.
• Permit sale at a price substantially below expected marginal cost. In contrast to a price
set far above expected marginal cost of meeting a target, permits may be offered at a price far
below expected marginal cost. The safety valve instrument then becomes, in effect, an emissions
tax. A good example is the CO2 emissions reduction and trading program for the Danish
electricity sector (Ellerman, 2000; Pedersen, 2000). The essential features of this program are
that (1) emissions are capped at a level that is initially about 30% below average annual
emissions in 1994-98, and they can be traded, (2) incumbents are grandfathered, and (3) the
penalty for exceeding the limit is 40 Danish kroner per metric ton of CO2 (roughly $5.00 per ton
CO2 or $18 per ton C). There is a quantity limit and what might seem like a penalty for
exceeding that limit. However, the penalty is sufficiently low with export levels characteristic of
the baseline period that the probability of payment is high.7 The system is not so much a hard cap
with tradable emissions as it is a tax with tradable exemptions. Thus two effects result from a
safety valve set far below the expected marginal cost at the level of the cap: it relaxes the target
emissions reduction and it effectively changes the control instrument from quantity to price.
3. THE HISTORY OF THE SAFETY VALVE IN THE CLIMATE DEBATE
3.1 Domestic and international proposals
Proposals for a safety valve in the context of the Kyoto commitments appear to have been
aimed at these two targets: both avoiding excessive cost by relaxing the emissions target and
moving from quantity target to a price penalty. In the U.S. at least, the Kyoto target was widely
viewed as overly stringent, and advocates of the safety valve proposed starting its
implementation with “looser goals than are required by the Protocol,” and with the suggestion
that this loosening could be achieved through the manipulation of a safety valve price (e.g.,
Pizer, 1999; Kopp et al., 1998). Analyses carried out in the late 1990s estimated that the carbon
price required to achieve the Kyoto targets would be in the range of $50 to over $200 per ton C,
depending on the assumption about Annex I trading (Weyant and Hill, 1999). Meanwhile, other
studies taking a longer-term perspective, with a focus on benefit-cost considerations (e.g.,
Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) or cost effective approaches to atmospheric stabilization (e.g.,
Manne and Richels, 1999) indicated that an appropriate near-future period price was much
lower, in the range of $5 to $14 per ton C. Although the safety valve proposal did not draw
explicitly on the latter studies, the proposed safety level, $25 per ton C (Kopp et al., 1999;
Barnes, 2001), would have kept marginal costs close to the range they indicated as appropriate in
the early years of greenhouse gas control.
The institution of a safety valve price was also seen as having the additional advantage of
moving to a price instrument from the quantity-based approach set in the Kyoto Protocol. In a set
of simulation studies considering cost uncertainty, Pizer (1997) had demonstrated the superiority
of this hybrid approach to a pure quantitative target on efficiency grounds. He argued that,
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6although the preferred tax-like instrument is not politically acceptable in the US, “. . . [with cap-
and-trade and a safety valve] the advantages of a carbon tax can be achieved without the baggage
accompanying an actual tax” (Pizer, 1999).
Proposals for a low safety valve price also envisaged increasing its level over time, perhaps at
some point to a level sufficient to achieve the original quantity target (Kopp et al., 1998, 1999;
Pizer, 1999). A number of arguments were made to highlight the advantages of such a pattern of
gradually-rising emissions prices, including the value of early price signals in setting
expectations of needed change, and the avoidance of restrictions that force premature and
expensive turnover of capital stock. Some proponents even anticipated that a safety valve price
might eventually converge to a pure quantity system, as cost uncertainties were reduced with
time and experience (e.g., Pizer, 1999). Along the way to such a transition the use of a safety
valve would essentially serve to redirect the form of emissions control, changing the focus of
regulatory decision-making from quantities to prices.
These ideas were carried over into the international discussion in the form of a proposal that
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol might be met by paying, say, a $50 per ton C “compliance
penalty” (Kopp, Morgenstern and Pizer, 2000; Kopp et al., 2001; Hourcade and Ghersi, 2002).
Any revenues collected in this process would be devoted to the purchase of emissions reductions
in the second commitment period, in addition to negotiated second-period obligations. The
purchases would be made by soliciting offers for project-based credits in an open auction in
which all parties could participate. Again, the proposed penalty was small in relation to most
estimates of the marginal cost of meeting the Kyoto targets if all of Annex I, including the US,
were participating. In effect, acceptance of this proposal would have shifted the negotiations
from the quantity targets to the compliance penalty, and so again it can be seen as another, and
indeed creative, attempt to change the architecture of the Kyoto agreement. Further, Kopp et al.
(2001) argued that this change would encourage ratification of the Protocol by all Annex I
countries by overcoming opposition based on the risk of unacceptably high cost.
3.2 Questions and opposition
Despite the efficiency arguments in favor of a price instrument for controlling a stock
pollutant, and for a safety valve if a quantity instrument is nonetheless chosen in the political
process, the concept has met with questions in some quarters and strong opposition in others.
The arguments range from a threat of being forced to do too much too soon to a worry about
achieving too little.
A first set of concerns flows logically from a belief that the Kyoto targets were
inappropriately stringent. Making an overly tight target more palatable by a lower safety valve
price could be seen as a form of “bait and switch.” The fear is that, if the stringent target
remained in place, the safety valve level would be increased at a rapid pace to meet the target.
Discussions of doing just that only strengthened this concern.
From this point of view, the safety valve may be questioned on the same grounds as a pure
quantity approach: what logic or analysis lies behind the initial level of restriction and associated
cost, and its planned evolution in the future? Economic studies differ in their conclusions about
the right level of near-term stringency and especially in the appropriate path over time. The
variation originates in differences in views about the net damages of climate change and non-
7climate benefits associated with emissions reduction, and differences in the handling of the
turnover of the capital stock and the contribution of technical change. Also, studies may or may
not consider the role of possible future reduction in uncertainty. But most of them agree that for a
stock pollutant like the greenhouse gases an economically efficient path would start out at a low
to moderate level and rise over time. While adding a safety valve to a quantity constraint
embodying the sharp reductions of the Kyoto Protocol would have deferred the costs, the more
fundamental objection is whether these costs are warranted at all at this early stage.
By contrast, environmental groups are opposed to the safety valve because of the potential
loss of “environmental integrity.” Integrity in this sense is a concept that invokes images of the
sort of threshold that would justify a quantity constraint, and it is seen as put at risk in several
ways. These opponents may have suspected that the safety valve was proposed not so much to
support an economically efficient implementation of a target reduction as to relax it. Also, the
U.S. public’s distaste for any regime that smacks of taxes is well known, and environmental
advocates may have believed that such a change of focus would lead to diminished public
support and doom the cap-and-trade proposal from the outset. The fear of an inevitable
confounding of revenue-raising and environmental objectives is palpable in several of the
position papers issued by environmental NGOs at international negotiating sessions. Finally, it is
argued that provision of an “easy out,” and the concomitant truncation of the distribution of cost
outcomes, diminishes the pressure to innovate, and reduces the incentive to early action to build
an inventory of emissions permits as a hedge against higher costs in the future.8
4. POTENTIAL FUTURE ROLE OF THE SAFETY VALVE
The policy context has changed substantially from the early days of the safety valve proposal
when nations were considering full Annex B implementation of the original Kyoto targets and
arguing over restrictions on emissions trading. In 2001, the U.S. removed itself from the Kyoto
Protocol, and this act greatly lowered the potential demand (and prospective price) for
international emissions credits. Moreover, in subsequent negotiations the Parties relaxed the
targets of some nations by the liberal allocation of carbon sinks, and abandoned any attempt to
place quantitative limits on international purchases of emissions reductions. As a result, if the
Annex B nations (less the US) were to make use of all the flexibility now provided in the
agreement, the marginal cost of meeting the targets established by the Kyoto Protocol would be
very low. In effect, a Kyoto agreement attempting large early emissions reductions, implying
emissions prices over a hundred dollars per ton of carbon for some nations (e.g., Weyant and
Hill, 1999), has been converted to a gradual-start agreement that could be achieved at prices in
the single digits (Babiker et al., 2002).
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would lead to a higher price, but the Bush Administration has rejected applying mandatory
measures to greenhouse emissions, at least in the period to 2012.
The future of the safety valve depends on the conditions that hold at some future time when
cap-and-trade systems might take a substantial role in greenhouse gas control. Will that future be
similar to the original Kyoto circumstance, wherein the targets adopted strain political
credibility, or will the quantity targets be set on a gradual path of increasing stringency? Further,
what will be the pressures for and against a move from a quantity based system (which underlies
the adoption of cap and trade) to a regime based on price? We look at each of these possible
outcomes, as they may arise in the domestic context in the US, and elsewhere. We then turn to
the promise and problems of a quantity constraint with a safety valve if a regime of international
emissions trading were to evolve.
4.1 Application in domestic systems
The attraction of a safety valve depends on the dangers from which it is intended to provide
“safety”. It is conceivable that political conditions could lead again to the setting of an emissions
target imposing great short-term stringency, as many observers thought was the case for the U.S.
under the Kyoto Protocol. The implied carbon-equivalent price would be far above the range of
estimates of the marginal benefit of short-term reductions, and perhaps so high as to be
unattainable in practice. The conditions that helped stimulate the safety valve proposal in the first
place would be recreated, and the proposal would have the same advantages and raise the same
objections as before. Alternatively, as suggested by the current state of the Kyoto Protocol and
U.S. policy, emissions caps could start at less stringent levels, and tighten over time. The
inclusion of a safety valve might still be argued, but the danger of unacceptably high prices is
decidedly less.
The danger to which the safety valve provides an escape also depends on the presence of
another feature common to cap-and-trade systems, permit banking, which also dampens price
fluctuations. In both the U.S. Acid Rain Program and the proposed EU Trading System (CEC,
2001), unused allowances can be banked from one period to the next, and this temporal
flexibility reduces the extent to which prices will fluctuate in response to changing conditions.9
When prices are lower than expected in some period, inventory is accumulated causing prices to
be higher in that period than they would otherwise be; however, when prices are higher than
expected, inventory is drawn down causing prices in that period to be lower than they otherwise
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9would be. While banking will not have as large a price-reducing effect as a pure safety valve
when costs are higher than expected, it will have a greater price-supporting effect when costs are
lower than expected since safety valve proposals do not include a floor price.
Even so, problems might arise when a cap-and-trade system is first introduced. The initial
periods are ones in which cost uncertainty will be greatest and a bank of permits will not yet be
available, so price-dampening effects of carry-over will not operate. Moreover, the accumulation
of an appropriate inventory would raise costs in the initial periods. To the degree that the initial
price is a problem, an even lower initial cap or early action credits can provide protection against
an unacceptably high initial price. The inclusion of borrowing would also mitigate a start-up
problem, as well as enhance the price-reducing effect that comes with banking alone, although it
is not a common feature of cap-and-trade systems.10 Where these provisions are not sufficient to
allay cost worries at start-up, a safety valve can be of help.
For some observers, the issue is not so much the danger of unacceptably high cost outcomes
as it is getting the control instrument right in the first place, that is, converting the control regime
from emissions caps to emissions price. The objective is understandable on efficiency grounds,
but it is questionable whether the implied fading away of quantity targets is likely even if the
safety valve were widely applied. Consider the Kyoto Protocol with all Annex B participating as
an example. Emissions reductions in response to a low safety valve price would have fallen
substantially short of the original Kyoto target, and this condition might hold over many years. A
$25 carbon-equivalent U.S. safety-valve price rising at a sometimes-proposed 7% per year
(Morgenstern, 2002) would not, under the cost estimates summarized by Weyant and Hill
(1999), have achieved the U.S. Kyoto target for many decades, if ever.11
With a hybrid policy made up of such apparently inconsistent parts, which component would
be more likely to be abandoned? In our view it is the price component, or at least the idea of a
price rising gradually over time. At the very least, the never-achieved quantity target and the low
“escape” valve price would be a continuing source of controversy and conflict over the issue of
“integrity”. Unless accompanied with some broad agreement about the appropriate long term
path of emissions prices, and acceptance of its “emissions tax” features, the safety valve would
be little more than a band-aid on an inappropriate implementation of cap and trade. Perhaps it
would be a useful addition in the short run, but its adoption would leave unresolved the more
important issue of the appropriate level of emissions control.
The inclusion of a safety valve feature in the recently proposed New Zealand action plan
shows that the appeal of this idea is not limited to the US. This proposal would limit the cost in
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prices to achieve the target.
10
the first commitment period to NZ$25 per ton of CO2 or US$40 per ton C (NZ, 2002). We have
already noted the safety valve character of the Danish penalty fee at about US$18 per ton C and
other non-U.S. examples can be found. The Dutch solicitations for joint implementation credits
are capped at a price of about $38 per ton C and the Australian state government of New South
Wales recently announced a penalty of A$15 per ton of CO2 (US$31 per tC) for failure to meet
emission reduction targets (Reuters, 2002). These examples suggest that price rather than
physical constraint could emerge as the key policy variable within an individual country. A
remaining question, however, is whether such domestic systems are compatible with
international trade in emissions permits.
4.2 The safety valve in a system of international permit trade
Under any multinational agreement with quantity targets, the marginal costs of control will
differ among the parties. Thus, just as trade among individual emitters can lower the costs of a
national emissions cap, cross-border trade can reduce the costs of an international agreement.
Such exchange is provided for under the Kyoto Protocol, and the potential value of this device is
indicated by the fact that some international transactions are occurring even before the Protocol
has gone into force.12 A question that needs to be addressed, therefore, is whether the existence
of a safety valve in one or more of the trading partners may create barriers to international
market development.
The concern is the potential for sales under a safety valve to create a new source of
international “hot air” that drives out credits based on real reductions, an emissions trading
variant of Gresham’s Law.13 Suppose, for example, that the market-clearing price in the
international permit market rose above the safety valve price in one of the participating
countries. Private agents, whether firms or individuals, could purchase permits at the government
“safety valve” window and either sell them directly into the international market or use them in
place of other permits transferred abroad. If permits were freely exchangeable, as would be
desired for a well-functioning market, the lowest safety valve price among the trading partners
would set the international emissions price. Even short of this outcome, difficulties could be
created for market trading.
This problem might be controlled in several ways. First, all international transactions could be
limited to government-to-government exchange of quotas. This restriction would, of course,
sacrifice many of the efficiencies expected from international permit exchange. Second, if
permits were devolved to private parties who were allowed to trade internationally, a web of
restrictions could be imposed to attempt to prevent exchanges of hot air. All national regulations
would need to forbid permit sales from any country whose safety valve level fell below the
international price. In a market where the prices of traded permits are likely to fluctuate over
time, and banking of permits is allowed, this approach seems clearly infeasible.
                                                 
12
 E.g., see “International Economy: Companies Agree to First Pollution Permit Swap,” Financial Times, 7 May
2002.
13
 “Hot air” refers to emissions permits that Russia, Ukraine and others have available to sell under the Kyoto
Protocol, even with no emissions reduction, because economic difficulties alone are expected to reduce their
emissions far below their Kyoto targets. Gresham’s Law concerns the circulation of debased coins and states
succinctly that “Bad money drives out the good.”
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Finally, each of the countries participating in the international trading regime could impose its
own cap-and-trade system and safety valve, and then agree on a common safety valve price.
International permit trade would then occur only in times when the market price was below the
level of the global safety valve. This idea is close to that introduced earlier of a globally agreed
compliance penalty, to be paid at the time of summing up at the end of a compliance period
(Kopp et al., 2001). As in a domestic implementation, evaluation of this proposal depends on the
relation of the negotiated safety valve price to the expected marginal cost of meeting the
negotiated caps, country by country. If the price is low enough to be triggered frequently, then in
effect the agreement is a globally harmonized carbon tax, and if such a multi-nation agreement
were achievable (which we think not), the whole system of negotiating quantitative emissions
targets would not be needed in the first place.
It is worth noting that these problems of emissions market development in the presence of a
safety valve can arise in the domestic context as well, if different systems are applied across
sectors of an economy. In the U.S. for example, proposals have been made for the imposition of
cap and trade only in the electric power sector alone, perhaps with a safety valve provision
(CBO, 2001). Separate proposals have been made for designing a system of trading of permits
under the U.S. system of regulating the corporate average fuel economy of motor vehicles, again
with a safety valve included.14 If these two systems, perhaps designed under separate bodies of
legislation, were (as anticipated in some proposals) to be joined in a domestic trading system,
then the same problems as noted above would arise, and a similar menu of corrections would
have to be considered so long as a safety valve was somewhere in use.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Several generalizations can be drawn from this exploration of the safety valve concept as it
might be applied in the climate area. First, if GHG emissions are to be limited (inappropriately in
this instance) by the use of a quantity instrument, some feature should be included to avoid the
consequences of the complete inflexibility in quantities. The requisite flexibility can be provided
by a safety valve or (provided phase-in measures can be taken to deal with start-up problems) by
a banking provision, as has been the case with previous cap-and-trade programs. If appropriate
phase-in is not feasible, or there is no banking, then a safety valve definitely should be provided.
Two more fundamental issues are, however, often implicit in safety valve proposals. Should
the GHG emission limitation goal be achieved by a price or a quantity instrument? And what that
goal should be however it is to be achieved? As we have emphasized, the argument for the use of
a price instrument for controlling GHG emissions is very strong but, economic reasoning
notwithstanding, the dominant choice seems still to be the quantity instrument, not only in the
U.S. but also in Europe and elsewhere. That being said, the appropriate goal now and in the
future remains an issue. It may be desirable to adopt a safety valve in conjunction with a quantity
limit on GHGs, particularly if there is no other way to tame an over-ambitious target. But
                                                 
14
 Sweeney (2001) outlines a proposal for applying a safety valve provision to the U.S. regulation of Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) of the auto fleet. Credits (or deficits) under CAFE might be made tradable
among manufacturers, and a government safety valve could be added to “. . . prevent excessive cost . . . in the
event that unforeseen market changes or errors in setting targets”.
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application of the safety valve proposal will naturally raise objections concerning how these
inconsistent components are to be harmonized. Phasing in a target would seem to be a better
approach, perhaps with a safety valve to handle anxieties in a start-up period. Once a cap-and-
trade system is in place, similar results can be achieved without the safety valve if provision is
made for banking, and perhaps borrowing. Finally, assuming it will prove no easier to coordinate
a global safety valve than it has been to decide on a global carbon tax, the phasing out of any
safety valves in national programs will be required to create a well-functioning international
market in emissions permits.
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APPENDIX: The Economics of Instrument Choice
A recurring issue in environmental economics is whether a quantity instrument, such as a cap,
or a price instrument, such as a tax, is more appropriate on efficiency grounds. Under conditions
of certainty, the policymaker can be indifferent: either will achieve the environmental goal at
least cost. Under uncertainty, however, they are not equivalent. This appendix explains why.
Consider first the equivalence of price and quantity instruments under certainty. The marginal
cost of emissions reduction is conveniently expressed in the form of a Marginal Abatement Cost
(MAC) curve, shown by the solid line in Figure 1. Marginal cost in $/ton is plotted on the
vertical axis and total emissions, E, on the horizontal. The upward-sloping, dashed line expresses
the Marginal Social Cost (MSC) or damages caused by these emissions. If the MAC and MSC
relationships are known with certainty, the economically efficient level of control (indicated by
the intersection of the curves) can be achieved equally well by capping emissions at T or by
imposing a tax equal to MC(T). The total cost of emissions abatement is the area under the MAC
curve between E′ and T.
MC(T)
E ′ ET
$/ton
MSCMAC
Figure 1. Quantity Target or Price Under Certainty
Unfortunately, the cost and benefit relationships are never known with certainty. At best,
policymakers have only some rough notion of their placement, and therefore ex ante they can
never be sure of the best control level, even though they know enough to warrant some level of
control. Most studies of environmental issues indicate that the general shapes of the curves are as
portrayed in Figure 1. That is, as emissions are reduced the marginal cost of abatement increases,
and the marginal social cost (or, equivalently, the marginal benefit of further reduction)
diminishes. The now classic answer to the question about instrument choice under uncertainty,
attributable to Weitzman (1974), focuses on the rates at which the costs rise and benefits fall as
emissions are reduced.
Weitzman’s point can be illustrated with two variations of Figure 1. In Figure 2a the slope of
the marginal cost of abatement is relatively flat and the slope of the marginal damage from
emissions is relatively steep. As abatement diminishes (or as emissions increase along the
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horizontal axis), the marginal cost of abatement falls relatively little compared to the marginal
damages which rise more rapidly. In the opposite case, shown in Figure 2b, the slope of the
MAC is relatively steep but the slope of the MSC is relatively flat. As an example, assume that
the MAC curve is believed to be at some reference level, MACR, but it might be higher at MACH,
or lower at MACL. Forced to operate with incomplete information, policymakers might believe
that their best choice is represented by the intersection of the MACR and MSC curves. But they
also know they may be proved wrong: the best level of control may turn out to have been the
intersection of the MSC curve with the MACH or MACL curves. They have no option but to
decide on the basis of the limited information, but the choice of instrument to achieve the
preferred level of control is no longer a matter of indifference.
MSC(X)
MAC
XTR
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ETH
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MCH(TH
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Figure 2. The Choice Between Quantity and Price
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Suppose in the world depicted in Figure 2a they assume reference cost conditions and choose
a tax as the instrument of control. The desired level of emissions in this case would be TR, which
regulators would seek to achieve by setting a price of MCR(TR), where MCR denotes marginal
cost under Reference conditions. But then suppose the true MAC was later revealed to be MACH.
The resulting emissions, shown as point X, would be far above the desired level (TH) under these
conditions, yielding marginal social costs of emissions MSC(X) far above the marginal
abatement cost. Regulators would have been better off had they chosen a quantity limit, set at TR,
as the control instrument.
 
Had they done so, emissions would have been much closer to the
desired level (TH) under high cost conditions. While the choice of the “wrong” instrument will
always lead to higher marginal cost or higher emissions than would be optimal (or lower if the
shift is to MACL), the choice of a quantity instrument in this case leads to a much smaller
departure from the desired level. This result comes about because the rate of increase in marginal
damages as emissions increase is greater in absolute value than the rate at which marginal costs
of abatement are falling. Alternatively, if the world is that depicted in Figure 2b, the choice of
the tax at MCR(TR) would be the preferred approach because the resulting level of emissions
would remain close to the optimal level of control once the uncertainty is resolved. In contrast,
application of the quantity target TR in this latter case would, under high cost conditions, yield a
marginal cost MCH(TR) far above the marginal social cost at this level of control.
The slopes of these curves are abstractions but they represent real-world alternatives that are
relevant to instrument choice in the climate change policy debate. Desired levels of
environmental control are often formulated as critical thresholds, a concept that implies that
damages increase rapidly as the level of emissions approaches or exceeds some level. This
situation is depicted in Figure 2a. Serious losses of welfare occur if emissions are not kept close
to the optimal level. The alternative circumstance, shown in Figure 2b, is one in which the
marginal damages do not change greatly as emissions vary. This latter case characterizes “stock”
pollutants, such as the greenhouse gases, whose damages depend on accumulated emissions
instead of current releases.
If a quantity instrument is chosen for controlling a stock pollutant like greenhouse gases
nonetheless, the adverse consequences of that choice can be reduced by a safety valve, as
illustrated in Figure 3. Assume, for example, that the regulator sets the quantity target at the
right level, TR, believing that MACR represents the best existing estimate of costs. Suppose also
that the regulator recognizes that the uncertainty surrounding costs may result in the relationship
depicted by MACH and agrees to sell emission permits without limit at a safety valve price, PSV,
at or near the expected marginal cost at the optimal emissions level.15 If MACH is realized, then
the emitters would abate to level X and buy permits in the amount X – TR. Emissions will be
slightly higher than what is revealed to be the optimal level, TH, but the loss in welfare is far less
that what would have occurred without the safety valve.
                                                 
15
 The logic behind the safety valve would call for the regulatory authority also to offer to buy back any unused
permits at price PSV, but this additional provision is typically not included in safety valve proposals. The concern
is (illogically) to avoid the welfare losses associated with significantly non-optimal pricing of the environmental
amenity in high cost outcomes, but not in low cost outcomes.
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Figure 3. The Safety Valve
The welfare effects of the difference between ex ante expectation and ex post realization are
illustrated by the areas beneath the two curves. Because emissions are at level X rather than at
the ex post optimal TH, total costs are lower by the area under the MAC curve between X and TH,
while the social costs of the higher emissions are greater by the area under the MSC curve over
this range. With the safety valve, therefore, the welfare loss is the area of the triangle a-b-c. In
contrast, if a fixed quantitative target had been imposed at TR without a safety valve, the total
abatement costs would be higher by the area under the MAC between TH and TR, while the total
social costs of the emissions would be lower by the area under the MSC over the same distance.
The welfare loss is the triangle 0-a-d. It is this much greater welfare loss that motivates the
argument for price instruments in the climate change policy debate, and for the addition of the
safety valve to quantity targets.
Figures 3 shows what might be called the “pure” safety valve, where the price is set near to
expected marginal cost if emissions are held to the cap. The effect when the safety is set far
below this level is illustrated in Figure 4. Here the quantity limit is set at TR and the expected
cost under reference conditions is MCR(TR), but the safety valve price for exceeding the quantity
limit is set far below, at P′. As before, at a price of P′ under reference conditions, emissions will
be ER and the cost to emitters will be the area beneath the MAC curve between the points a and
ER, plus a payment to the regulator of P′(ER – TR). It is not obvious why such a low price in
relation to expected marginal cost at TR would be chosen, but it may be that MSCL is believed to
be a more accurate representation of climate damage. If so, then P′ is the optimal tax and all that
TR does is to determine the level of exemption from the tax. Whatever the reason, however, if a
target such as TR is agreed and escape mechanisms like P′ is included, two fundamental changes
have been made: the target reduction has been changed from TR to ER and the control instrument
has been changed from quantity to price.
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Figure 4. Safety Valve Acts as an Emissions Tax
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